Institute of Philosophy and Sociology

In this paper I will try to systematically lay out and describe the multiple dimensions of the embodied experience of illness, which until recently has been the main focus within the field of the phenomenology of medicine. In order to do this, I will turn to analysis of the nature of embodiment in Husserl's phenomenology. I will argue that based on Hus⁠ serl's phenomenology of the body, one can distinguish four ways of experiencing one's body, or four dimensions of embodiment. I will distinguish between experience of one's body as 1) a bearer of sensations (the affective dimension of embodiment); 2) a seat of free movement, characterized by the faculty of " I can " (the functional dimension of embodiment); 3) a material thing in a causal relationship with the material world (the material dimension of embodiment); 4) a material thing embedded in a social context (the social dimension of embodiment). I will then apply the proposed classification of dimensions of embodiment to the experience of illness, focusing on the various ways these dimensions have been used within the phenomenology of medicine. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it provides a framework for classification of the existing interpretations of the experience of illness; secondly, it opens up a way for a comprehensive analysis of the experience of illness which includes both individual and social aspects of embodiment as well as their mutual intertwining.

During the last few decades, many thinkers have advocated for the importance of the phenomenological approach in developing the understanding of the lived experience of illness. In their attempts, they have referred to ideas found in the history of phenomenology, most notably, in the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. The aim of this paper is to sketch out an interpretation of illness based on a yet unexplored conceptual framework of the phenomenology of French thinker Jean-Luc Marion. Focusing on concepts of the saturated phenomenon and flesh, the paper develops an interpretation of illness as the saturated phenomenon, which highlights a variety of dimensions of illness already elaborated within the phenomenology of medicine, such as the affective dimension of illness, the disruptive dimension of illness, the transformed perception of the self in illness, mineness of flesh in illness and the inexpressible and hermeneutical dimension of illness. In addition to that, the paper explores some of the consequences the proposed interpretation of illness offers regarding the nature of illness and health. It is argued that illness in its essence is very similar to the experience of other saturated phenomena, suggesting that the difference between them does not lie within the character of the affective givenness, but rather within the dynamic relationship between the affective givenness and its conceptualization. It is also shown that the experience of health is compatible with the experience of saturation and thus is not limited to the tacit and harmonious background state.

French thinker Jean-Luc Marion (Jean-Luc Marion) is probably best known for his hypothesis of the ‘saturated phenomenon’ (phénomène saturé) – a hypothesis of a phenomenon that is characterized through the excess of intuition over intention. Marion’s scholars have been mainly interested in this hypothesis of the saturated phenomenon without paying any attention to the distinction made by Marion himself between the saturated phenomenon and the saturated saturated phenomenon or the phenomenon of revelation. A close reading of Marion’s work Being Given (Étant donné) reveals unconditional phenomena that are not saturated with intuition – Marion calls them ‘phenomena of revelation’. Contrary to saturated phenomena, which are described as intuitive givenness, phenomena of revelation are described as givenness without intuition.
The aim of this paper is to question the phenomenological possibility of the phenomenon of revelation. This presupposes questioning the meaning of ‘givenness without intuition’ which is done in the first part of the paper ‘The meaning of the phenomenon of revelation.’ The second part of the paper ‘The phenomenon of revelation: birth, time, death and Revelation’ is devoted to the question – how does givenness without intuition (birth, death, time and Revelation) show itself? It is argued that, based both on examples of the phenomenon of revelation and on its description found in Marion’s work In Excess (De surcroît), givenness without intuition shows itself indirectly. However, the idea of ‘indirect phenomenalization’ is itself problematic. Therefore, in the third part of the paper ‘The impossibility of the phenomenon of revelation’ the following question is posed – is indirect phenomenalization a phenomenological possibility? Are there phenomena that show themselves both indirectly and unconditionally?
In the first part of the paper concepts of ‘phenomenon’, ‘givenness’ and ‘’intuition’ are analyzed. It is concluded that, according to Marion, phenomena as givens can manifest themselves at least in two different ways – 1) as intentional objects (either resulting from an adequation between signitive intention and intuition (in the case of ideal objects) or resulting from an inadequation between them due to a lack of intuition in relation to signitive intention (in the case of a perception of a thing) and 2) as saturated phenomena resulting from the inadequation between signitive intention and intuition due to the excess of intuition in relation to signitive intention. However, Marion argues for the third possibility as well – givens can manifest themselves both nonintentionally and non-intuitively. Givenness must not necessary be either that of intention or intuition; there is a third option – pure givenness or givenness that does not show itself on either the basis of intention or intuition, but on the basis of itself.
The difference between the saturated phenomenon and the phenomenon of revelation, according to Marion, lies in the fact that the former is still determined according to the relationship between intuition and signitive intention, while the latter transcends these elements and is determined based on the givenness alone. However, he also maintains that intuition (understood as givenness that shows itself in and from itself without any mediation) is free from any intention, that is, it can be given without any relation to the intention. If this is the case, in order to argue for the non-intuitive character of the phenomenon of revelation, it is not enough to show its detachment from intention. In the second part of the paper, based on Marion’s examples of the phenomenon of revelation, it is concluded that the phenomenon of revelation is indeed non-intuitive, but not because it cannot be measured against intention, but because it shows itself indirectly.
The rest of the second part of the paper is devoted to a brief analysis of the four examples of the phenomenon of revelation, in order to ascertain whether all of them can be characterized through indirect phenomenalization. It is concluded that the phenomenon of my birth, the phenomenon of the death of the other and the phenomenon of Revelation can be characterized as phenomena that show themselves indirectly. The phenomenon of time and the phenomenon of my death do not show themselves indirectly (the former shows itself directly, the latter does not show itself at all) and, therefore, are not taken into account in evaluating the possibility of non-intuitive givenness.
In the last part of the paper it is argued that, based on Marion’s examples of givenness without intuition (my birth, death of the other and Revelation), it can be equated either 1) with unfulfilled meaning-intention (something that is merely thought) or 2) with the speculative ideal. In both cases Marion is not able to maintain the characterization of non-intuitive givenness as unconditional givenness that shows itself of itself and from itself. In other words, indirect phenomenalization can be equated with either phenomenon that shows itself as intentional object within the reduced sphere of transcendental subjectivity or with the speculative ideal that exceeds the sphere of reduced experience. In the first case it loses its unconditional character, in the second case its phenomenological possibility. The phenomenon of revelation as Marion describes it – unconditional non-intuitive givenness that shows itself indirectly – is phenomenologically impossible.